GSN Exclusive – With SBInet behind it, CBP develops a new procurement strategy

Mark Borkowski

U.S. Customs and Border Protection thinks it has learned a few important lessons from its ill-fated SBInet program, and has conceived of a brand-new approach to using technology to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing the U.S.-Mexican border.

The SBInet program was intended to be an all-encompassing, fully-integrated, state-of-the-art surveillance system that consciously pushed the envelope to develop new technical approaches to meeting operational goals which hadn’t truly been defined yet. By contrast, the current more-modest approach by CBP aims to procure “non-developmental, commercial-off-the-shelf” systems that have already proven themselves and that will not necessarily be integrated together.

One of the architects of this new procurement strategy is Mark Borkowski, CBP’s assistant commissioner for technology innovation and acquisition, who spoke exclusively with Government Security News on Jan. 20. To understand where CBP is now headed, said Borkowski, it would be useful to understand what went wrong with SBInet.

Essentially, during the Bush administration and the early years of the newly-created Department of Homeland Security, the senior leadership of CBP were in a big hurry to gain control over illegal immigrants who were crossing the southern border day and night, with impunity, by the thousands. Even before they had figured out how the U.S. Border Patrol would operationally use enhanced video surveillance, radar, ground sensors, tactical communications and other technologies, CBP decided to “outsource” the conception and implementation of this major interconnected undertaking to a world-class systems integrator.

“We used a competitive procurement program as a substitute for our own requirements analysis,” recalled Borkowski, of the birth of SBInet in 2006. “It was guaranteed to be a disaster.”

Technical problems emerged with individual components (which had never been deployed before) and with the integration of these systems (which had never been asked to work hand-in-hand before.) Schedule delays occurred. Criticism mounted. And eventually the Obama administration pulled the plug on SBInet in January 2011.

Today, Borkowski and his colleagues in CBP and the Border Patrol are pursuing a procurement strategy that envisions improving surveillance and communications along the border in bite-sized pieces. They have identified a series of individual programs and projects that, in theory, can purchase hardware and software that is ready to be put into the field immediately.

For example, CBP issued a draft RFP last month (and expects to issue the formal solicitation next month) for a new program it calls “Integrated Fixed Towers.” These towers, which will initially be installed in Arizona, will carry color cameras, night vision gear, radar and other sensors that will enable the Border Patrol to spot illegal immigrants at distances up to 7.5 miles away. Another effort, known as “Remote Video Surveillance Systems,” will upgrade some of the 253 existing surveillance sites in Arizona. A third program, “Mobile Surveillance Systems,” will mount cameras so they can be moved from location to location, depending on where Border Patrol agents see the most immediate needs.

CBP’s current procurement approach will focus on incremental enhancements to existing technical capabilities -- where the performance of operational systems is well understood -- rather than the more-ambitious and far-riskier approach adopted by the folks who ran the former SBInet program.

In part because his predecessors at CBP hadn’t adequately defined their own operational objectives, and in part because large systems integrators have a tendency to continuously expand their program’s technical scope, SBInet became large and unwieldy, said Borkowski.

“The system ended up with more than we needed – with all the bells-and-whistles – and we couldn’t defend why SBInet was worth it,” he remembered.

In part, this occurred because SBInet officials did not consult closely enough with the Border Patrol personnel who would ultimately use the newly-developed system. To illustrate the point, Borkowski told GSN  about an instance when he asked a senior official with the Border Patrol whether he was pleased with the functionality of the new ”Mobile Common Operating Picture,” or “Mobile COP,” as it was called. This was a system that would deliver surveillance images and other real-time data to an individual Border Patrol agent riding in his vehicle. The Border Patrol official was aghast, recalled Borkowski. “I don’t want individual agents to be making independent decisions as to what they will do,” said the Border Patrol leader. Instead, he wanted to be able to direct the agents from the command center, based on his more-complete situational awareness.

Borkowski says his approach to buying commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, rather than hiring a contractor to develop a brand-new system to meet a set of ill-defined government requirements, is generating all kinds of resistance. “It’s amazing to me how difficult it is to buy things this way,” he admitted.

Borkowski claims that no matter how often he and his colleagues try to explain their procurement approach to prospective contractors, many of the company executives simply don’t believe him. They remain convinced that ultimately the procurements will not be for non-developmental systems, but will expect the contractors to develop new systems to meet new specifications.