A better way to purchase blast resistant recepticles
Haber
The government best practice described here is not exclusive to any one city, state or federal government agency and is not being presented to endorse any specific product or vendor.
While reading this, be certain to:
1. Substitute the referenced anti-terrorism technology, if applicable, for any chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) related homeland security product your agency may be considering.
2. Make a list of the security benefits your agency will achieve by adapting these best practices to their future CBRNE-related procurements.
3. Make a list of the security gaps that might be created because the referenced best practices are not currently adopted by your agency for CBRNE requirements.
When finished, you will understand why testing standards, policies related to sensitive but unclassified information, and performance verification mandates are needed for most CBRNE related detection, identification, containment, mitigation and decontamination technologies. You are likely to discover security gaps that you can now close before they are exploited by terrorists.
Trash receptacles, a necessity for garbage collection, pose a moderate threat to public and personnel safety because of their ability to conceal an improvised explosive device (IED), also known as a bomb, planted by homegrown or foreign terrorists. To counter this threat, bomb resistant trash receptacles are being substituted for commercial receptacles in some geographic locations in the U.S.
Deployment locations and explosive protective ratings for the referenced bomb receptacle procurement will not be disclosed for security and because of a certain clause in the procurement contract.
This clause represents the first proactive step in non-classified government contracting to protect the performance capabilities and the deployment locations for bomb receptacles. Implementation of this clause in future government procurements represents a best practice that should be recognized by city, state and federal agencies.
Currently, there are no policies requiring vendors or government agencies to protect explosive protective ratings and deployment locations for bomb receptacles, despite the fact that terrorists could use this information to circumvent or defeat this technology. This policy void has resulted in some vendors releasing to the media, publicizing on their Web sites, and identifying in advertisements where their bomb receptacles are installed and their product’s explosive protective ratings.
This policy void has also resulted in some government agencies publicizing in unrestricted RFPs and RFQs similar sensitive information that could be used by terrorists when planning future attacks.
Telling homegrown and foreign terrorist organizations where bomb receptacles are installed and their respective explosive protective ratings creates soft targets that terrorists can easily defeat with larger bombs.
Explosive protective ratings stated by vendors may not be accurate and, thus, government agencies should not rely on submitted test reports to verify performance capabilities before deploying these bomb receptacles.
Testing standards that define the minimum performance requirements for bomb receptacles are not currently established. In the absence of such standards, some vendors have used the easiest testing parameters in order to appear to increase the explosive protective ratings for their product. Some examples of these unethical methods include testing without a base or lid on their trash can, testing on a sand surface so the ground absorbs blast energy and testing when inner wall filler materials have not reached their permanent stage. These are only some of the cowardly tactics put into practice for the sole purpose of claiming a higher explosive rating than a competitor. It has become a common practice that is clearly placing customers and beneficiaries of bomb receptacles at a disadvantage.
Performance verification mandates which require all government agencies to randomly select and test bomb receptacles prior to their deployment do not currently exist either. This absence of mandated testing has enabled vendors to defraud government agencies by providing them with test reports for product "A," even though they continue to deliver product "B." This bait-and-switch tactic has become a growing problem that has created security gaps at airports, train stations, government and corporate buildings, national parks, stadiums, malls, museums and other locations.
Fraud related to bomb receptacles can be verified easily by randomly selecting and testing currently deployed units. Tax dollars are paying for our protection and it is not unreasonable to ask elected officials to verify that the minimum performance requirements set forth by the purchasing agency are actually being met. For homeland security to work, effective public / private sector partnerships are necessary.
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Because the stakes are so high, explosives are inexpensive, and most bomb squads enjoy blowing things up in controlled environments, verifying performance capabilities for bomb receptacles makes a lot of sense.
Government and private sector testing have confirmed that most suppliers of bomb receptacles are misrepresenting their products’ ability to contain primary bomb fragmentation and not create secondary fragmentation. Even though test reports and videos confirm that blatant misrepresentation are being circulated, bomb receptacles continue to be deployed without being tested. To ensure the reliability of the receptacles cited in this best practice, the unnamed city conducted the first and only random selection product acceptance testing for bomb receptacles in U.S. history.
Testing was coordinated by the City of Denton fire department bomb squad and directed by their Fire Marshall / Bomb Squad Commander Rick Jones. Testing was witnessed by several members of the unnamed city’s government agency, its local fire department and the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. A pipe bomb test was conducted to verify primary bomb fragmentation containment. A high explosives test followed to verify the trash receptacle’s ability to withstand a high velocity explosion without creating secondary fragmentation. Both tests were conducted in the same trash can and the outer wall remained unpenetrated.
The void in performance verification testing for bomb receptacles has also resulted in ridiculous claims that, when accepted at face value, create a false sense of security and selection of improper deployment locations.
For example, an explosion in excess of "X" pounds will be contained to the point that a person 10 feet away will only hear a ringing in his or her ears. The massive amount of explosives from this ongoing claim was intentionally withheld because most deployed bomb resistant trash receptacles have lower protective ratings, and associating higher explosive protective ratings to this technology only increases security gaps. The CEO who keeps making this absurd claim has not personally demonstrated this phenomenon and government testing confirmed the company’s product creates secondary fragmentation during an explosion. A photo from the classified document, associated with the government testing referred to, illustrates that the side wall for this receptacle blew apart during one of the tests.
Establishing federal testing standards, policies to protect sensitive but unclassified information, and mandated performance verification testing for all CBRNE-related technologies are only the first steps that must be taken to protect all of us. Given the degree of fraud and corruption we are encountering in today’s society, we also require oversight, enforcement and accountability to combat wasteful spending and enhance all proactive homeland security initiatives funded by the American people.
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