9/11, A Decade Later -- Managing fear

Ben Sheppard

9/11 unleashed ripples of uncertainty and fear of further attacks in the following months. While this was expected, given the enormity of the event, did the federal and state response fuel the terror of terrorism?

I would argue that it did, and that effective risk communication strategies are still lacking 10 years later. Furthermore, failure to implement a comprehensive risk communication strategy that covers natural and man-made disasters will continue to undermine preparedness, response and recovery efforts.

It’s clear now that the U.S. Government had particular difficulty in communicating the risk of terrorism immediately after 9/11. Extensive concern prevailed that 9/11 attacks were the first in a wave of attacks on the U.S. The anthrax attacks that started in October 2001, helped to reinforce that perception.

The color-coded Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS) that was implemented in 2002 sought to inform the public of the current terrorist threat level. However, the HSAS failed to adequately contextualize the warnings by informing the public what actions they should embark on, based on the perceived threat level. Furthermore, the HSAS remained principally at yellow or orange, leading to “alert fatigue” among the public, further reducing its effectiveness. Attempts were made to improve the system with specific alert levels given to transport sectors and regions.

Years later, in April 2011, the HSAS was replaced by the two-tiered National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) that comprises “elevated” and “imminent” threat levels. But, moving from a five-tiered to a two-tiered system constrains the ability to vary the risk warnings, again risking alert fatigue. This is true despite the fact that the new NTAS provides a framework to better contextualize warnings.

As is amply demonstrated by ongoing tinkering with the alert system, DHS’s ability to effectively communicate the risk of terrorism remains a considerable challenge 10 years after 9/11. In 2010, the National Academies’ National Research Council released a report mandated by Congress which examined DHS risk analysis processes and was critical of the agency’s risk communication capabilities. That report strongly recommended that DHS formulate a “well-developed risk communication strategy” to “address the deficiencies to adequately understand the social and economic impacts of terrorist attacks.”

I couldn’t agree more, because the key challenge for society after a terrorist attack is to ensure that it manages and mitigates the ripple effects that cause people to undertake adverse avoidance behavior, which can cause further economic and social harm.

These avoidance behaviors can fall into two categories. The first comprises responses with mostly economic consequences, but limited effect on the well-being of individuals. These effects include a reduction in the use of a recently-targeted transport system, or less frequent attendance at locations previously attacked (e.g., shopping districts or restaurants).

At the other end of the spectrum are responses that potentially have adverse consequences for the safety and health of individuals and communities, as well as economic impacts. These are activities that pose a greater risk to an individual’s well-being, at the same time that the individual believes they are reducing the risk of being subjected to a terrorist attack (e.g., choosing a mode of transport or behavioral change that poses a greater risk to them.)

Examples of first-category responses after 9/11 included reduction in travel or attending specific events. An assessment of the longer-term behavioral effects of 9/11 in the five years after the attack reveals a significant proportion of individuals who continued to alter their lives. Gallup surveys revealed that approximately one-in-five Americans said they had permanently changed the way they lived as a result of 9/11, and a little more than half (53 percent) believed most Americans had changed their lifestyles.

To ascertain the nature of these behavioral changes, Gallup asked respondents over five years about their travel patterns and whether they go into skyscrapers or attend events with large crowds. Americans were less willing to travel overseas (48 percent in 2001 to 47 percent in 2006), and less willing to fly (43 percent in 2001 and 30 percent in 2006). Somewhat fewer said they were less willing to go into skyscrapers (35 percent in 2001 and 22 percent in 2006) or go to events attended by thousands of people (30 percent in 2001 and 23 percent in 2006).

The second category, responses by the public that cause harm to individuals on top of economic effects,  included a noted increase in the use of drugs and alcohol in the northeastern U.S. in the months after 9/11, to reduce the perceived fear and anxiety resulting from the attacks. These behaviors impacted the safety of drivers on the roads, causing an increase in traffic fatalities.

During the 2001 anthrax attacks, ineffective risk communications employed by public health professionals and the federal government also exacerbated the adverse reactions by the public. This included putting pressure on essential supplies of ciprofloxacin by those who unnecessarily took the antibiotic drug, an estimated 20 percent of whom experienced the drug’s side effects, and possibly risked changing the bacteriological environment from the widespread use of the antibiotics, rendering some organisms resistant to the antibiotics employed.